March 9, 2010

Graham
v.
Campo

By Kevin L. Connors

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently issued an Opinion in the above-captioned case on January 15, 2010, with there being two significant issues addressed by the Court.

The case involved a hit and run automobile accident in Philadelphia, with the Plaintiff’s car being rear-ended by a car, whose driver then fled the accident scene. The Plaintiff was not able to identify the driver, but witnesses were able to identify the fleeing vehicle’s license plate, allowing the Plaintiff, who was injured in the accident, to file a personal injury lawsuit against the owner of the vehicle.

In the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the vehicle owner was negligent in the operation of his car, and that the Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the owner’s negligence. In answering the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the car owner admitted owning the vehicle, but did not admit to operating the vehicle.

After the statute of limitations had passed, the car owner admitted at an Arbitration hearing that he was not the operator of the vehicle, as he identified a friend, obviously not a party in the lawsuit, as being the vehicle operator at the time of the accident.

At the Arbitration, the car owner argued that he could not be liable for the accident, as the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that he had been the driver of the vehicle, with the Arbitrator entering an award in favor of the car owner, and against the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff appealed the Arbitration award, and requested a trial de novo.

The Plaintiff also filed a Motion to amend her Complaint, to include a claim against the car owner for negligent entrustment. That Motion was denied by the Court, with reconsideration also being denied.

The matter was then tried as a bench trial, at which both the car owner and car driver testified, with the trial judge finding both witnesses to be “unreliable”, “untruthful”, and that their testimony was “self-impeaching.”

With the Plaintiff presenting expert medical testimony that the Plaintiff sustained a C7-C8-T1 nerve root injury, strains and sprains of her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine, and a possible brachial plexopathy and ulnar neuropathy injuries, coupled with the medical expert testifying that the Plaintiff’s injuries were permanent, the trial court found in favor of the Plaintiff, awarding the Plaintiff $191,317.81. Post-trial delay damages for $12,929.66 increased the total net verdict to $204,247.79.

The car owner filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief, requesting that the trial court judgment be set aside, and/or that a new trial be ordered. Those Motions were denied by the trial court, with the car owner appealing to the Superior Court.

Although several issues were raised on appeal, the critical issues were limited to:

1. Whether the trial court could enter judgment against the car owner, with there being no specific allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint that the car owner’s liability arose out of either negligent entrustment or his operation of the motor vehicle.
2. Whether the Plaintiff, a limited tort electee, had satisfied the limited tort threshold, entitling her to an award of non-economic damages.

On the issue of the sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s pleadings supporting an award of damages against the car owner, this argument did not go well for the car owner, as the Superior Court essentially ruled that Pennsylvania Courts take a liberal view of interpreting pleadings, and that Plaintiff’s allegations in her original Complaint that the car owner had been negligent in “violating the various statutes and municipal ordinances pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles in a public thoroughfare,” in the absence of any preliminary objection by the car owner, was an allegation general enough to find liability against the car owner for allowing an unlicensed driver to permissibly operate his vehicle.

The Superior Court further also held that the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged a “causally related chain of events which appellant had notice of from the very day of the accident and, therefore, was not prejudiced in his defense.”

The Superior Court also held that the car owner could not benefit from his having actively misled the Plaintiff into believing that he was driving the vehicle, as the car owner had not flatly denied that allegation in the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Finding that the car owner had actively concealed the identity of the car driver causing the accident until the statute of limitations had run, the Superior Court would not permit the car owner to claim prejudice at the trial court or appellate levels.

In ruling on the car owner’s appellate challenge that the trial court had erred in awarding non-economic damages to the Plaintiff, with the car owner claiming that the Plaintiff had failed to satisfy her limited tort threshold, the Superior Court rejected the car owner’s limited tort challenge, finding that the Plaintiff had satisfied the factors necessary to consider her injuries as having been “serious”, as required under Sections 1702 and 1705 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, relying upon the Plaintiff’s expert medical witness testimony that the Plaintiff had sustained injuries that “seriously impair several bodily functions”, and that the Plaintiff’s injuries would “affect her on a daily basis in her ability to reach, grasp, to use her arm on a repetitive basis”. The Superior Court also noted that the Plaintiff’s expert medical witness had testified that the Plaintiff’s injuries were permanent and that the Plaintiff “basically is going to have to live with the nerve damage”, despite continuing treatment several years post-accident.

Accepting the Plaintiff’s testimony that her injuries restricted her from doing daily activities, like vacuuming, washing her hair, styling her hair, getting dressed, putting on jewelry, mixing and cooking, driving, typing, taking spinning classes, and playing with her granddaughter, the Superior Court would not find that the trial court had erred in finding that the Plaintiff’s injuries were “serious”, such that the Court ruled that Plaintiff had satisfied the limited tort threshold, and that she was, therefore, entitled to an award of non-economic damages for pain and suffering.

Another challenge raised by the car owner was that the award in favor of the Plaintiff was excessive, shocking the conscience, with the Superior Court dismissing that argument, in reliance upon the Plaintiff’s testimony as to the impact of her injuries on her life, ruling that the trial court’s award “was not so grossly excessive as to shock our sense of justice.”

This Superior Court Opinion is significant for two reasons, the first being that it illustrates elemental principles of fairness implicit in the rules regarding pleadings, not only in terms of what is affirmatively pled, but also in terms of what is or is not denied, with the second, no less significant issue, being the Superior Court’s affirmation of the trial court’s threshold ruling that the Plaintiff had satisfied her burden of proof that her injuries were “serious”, a prerequisite for a limited tort Plaintiff to recover non-economic damages for pain and suffering under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Questions

Questions concerning casualty litigation practice and procedures, can be directed to our general litigation department attorneys.

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