January 5, 2009

Digest of
Appellate Decisions
December 2008

For more information, contact
Patricia S. Duffy, or
Kevin L. Connors
610.524.2100
or visit www.duffyconnors.com

Meigoc v. WCAB (Throop Fashions/Leslie Fay and ITS Hartford), 948 C.D. 2008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)

Casne v. WCAB (STAT Couriers, Inc. and State Workers’ Insurance Fund), 801 C.D. 2008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)

Meigoc v. WCAB (Throop Fashions/Leslie Fay and ITS Hartford),
948 C.D. 2008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)

Section 306(b)(3), requiring Employer to provide notice to Claimant of her ability to return to work, was properly applied in determining Employer’s petition to suspend benefits, even though the section was enacted after the date of Claimant’s injury.

Commonwealth Court reversed the decision of the Board and the WCJ, which granted Employer’s suspension petition. Claimant was injured in 1992 and Employer accepted liability. Employer filed a petition to suspend benefits in 2000 on the grounds that Claimant had refused available work that was within her medical restrictions. The WCJ denied the petition, ruling that Employer had failed to provide Claimant with a notice of her ability to return to work as required by section 306(b)(3), which was added to the Act after the date of Claimant’s injury. The Board reversed this decision, holding that the section imposed new legal burdens on employers and therefore could not be retroactively applied. The matter was remanded to the WCJ, who then granted the suspension, and, in the course of further proceedings, the Board twice reaffirmed its conclusion that the notice requirement was substantive.

On appeal, Claimant argued that this requirement was procedural only in nature and could be applied. The Court detailed the distinction between a law that affected substantive rights and one that merely established a method for enforcing a right, but had no bearing on whether a claimant had an entitlement to relief. The Court noted several previous cases and determined that the notice requirement of section 306(b)(3) did not alter the facts that an employer was required to provide in order to obtain a suspension of benefits. Rather, an employer was required to share new medical information concerning a claimant’s physical capacity to work and to notify the claimant that the new information could affect the claimant’s entitlement to benefits. Since the new requirement did not affect the substantive rights of either party, it was deemed a procedural provision that applied to the instant case. Accordingly, since Employer did not provide Claimant with a notice of her ability to return to work, the Board erred in affirming a suspension of benefits.

Casne v. WCAB (STAT Couriers, Inc. and State Workers’ Insurance Fund),
801 C.D. 2008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)

WCJ’s credibility determinations could not be reversed when sufficient evidence existed upon which the findings could be made.

Commonwealth Court affirmed the decisions of the Board and WCJ, which terminated Claimant’s benefits. Claimant was injured in a car accident during the course of her employment. Thereafter, Claimant began receiving benefits. A year later, Employer required Claimant to undergo a physical exam, and Employer’s physician declared that Claimant had recovered from her work-related injury. Employer filed the instant petition and Claimant answered, denying that she had fully recovered. The WCJ found testimony of Employer’s medical expert more credible than the testimony of Claimant’s treating physician.

On appeal, Claimant contended that Employer’s expert’s testimony was incompetent because he had failed to examine her neck. The Court detailed the reports reviewed by the doctor and his testimony with regard to his physical examination of Claimant. In that testimony, it was clear that the doctor had examined Claimant’s neck. It was not the role of the Court to assess the credibility of the expert’s testimony; the Court could only determine if there was sufficient evidence upon which the findings could be made. As such, the Court could not find that the WCJ’s conclusion regarding the expert’s opinion was not support by competent evidence. For the same reasons, the Court found that the WCJ’s assessment of Claimant’s lack of credibility were appropriate, since it was based on reasonable conclusions from the evidence and testimony presented. Accordingly, the decisions were affirmed.

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